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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 12/02/2004 Accident number: 121 
Accident time: 06:27 Accident Date: 10/05/1999 
Where it occurred: Cordon Sanitaire, Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: KMS 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: not applicable 
Date record created: 12/02/2004 Date  last modified: 12/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group were clearing the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border minefields at the time 
of the accident.  
An internal memo reporting on the accident was made available by the demining group in 
December 1999. The following summarises its content.  
The victim was a Team Leader whose duties included disarming R2M2 mines. At 06:27 the 
Victim was "neutralising" an R2M2 mine by removing its booster charge [unscrewed from 
below] when the mine detonated. Another Team Leader witnessed the event and reported 
that the Victim was wearing his protective equipment (visor and apron) properly. 
The blast removed both of the victim's hands and injured both his arms and his lower face. It 
damaged the collar of the blast apron and marked the visor, but the victim's face, throat and 
chest were believed to have been saved from severe injury by the protective equipment.  
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The victim was taken to the on-site medical facility after "10-15" minutes, and from there by 
ambulance to hospital [not identified]. 
The apron is shown below. The dark blue aramid inside the orange cotton cover is clearly 
visible on the left of the collar. 
 
 
The investigators decided that there were two possible reasons for the accident. Either the 
victim inadvertently applied pressure to the mine while unscrewing the booster or the 




Victim number: 157 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 







No medical report was made available. 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident has been listed as "Unavoidable" because it seems that 
the victim may have been working as directed when the accident occurred. However, if there 
was really a danger of crystallisation around the booster causing a detonation through friction 
when it was unscrewed (or delayed action of the mechanism) the group's management 
should have identified the danger and changed the SOP which called for disarming. See 
“Related papers”. 
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The disarming SOP is not widely employed throughout the demining industry, but was used 
until recently by the largest NGO involved in demining (and is still used in some countries by 
that group). Many field people feel that – as long as the final decision on the condition of a 
known device rests with them – the procedure is no more dangerous than laying a charge 
against the mine. There are not enough disarming/detonating accidents in this database for it 
to be used to provide evidence to make a compelling judgement on this issue. 
If the victim was inexperienced, poorly trained or poorly supervised, the accident would 
illustrate a failure of management. One of the ex-pat supervisors has subsequently stated that 
the victim was screwing an unfamiliar booster back into the mine when the accident occurred. 
It is possible that the unfamiliar booster was the type with a bayonet-fitting to take a plastic 
spike used to anchor the mine in moving soil. It was suggested that the supervisor was 
puzzled by it being different and screwed it back into the mine without thinking. [For details of 
the plastic spike, click on "More" at the Mine/device field on the Incident/accident tab.]  
 
Related papers 
When interviewed during December 1999, a representative of the demining group said that 
the victim had come to terms with his injuries well and confirmed that he had not suffered 
significant throat or face injuries. During the same interview the demining group management 
agreed that many deminers were inexperienced when recruited, but pointed out that  "the 
majority of deminers have now cleared more than 100 mines each".  
From the fact that each deminer found more than 100 mines, I infer that Team Leaders 
routinely dealt with disarming dozens of mines a day. The density of mines in the area being 
cleared was exceptional, and it is partly the huge number of mines that led to the group's 
policy of disarming for later demolition by burning. 
 
 
The “crystallisation” explanation given by the demining group does not make immediate 
sense. The researcher has dismantled many R2M2 mines in order to make detector test-
pieces (some shown above).   
 
In several cases the ball bearing mechanism has jammed and although the balls are lined up 
with their exit holes, they have not moved sideways to allow the spring-loaded pin to drop. In 
these cases, they could move at any time – which may explain why the mine went off as the 
supervisor unscrewed the booster charge. The picture alongside shows the mechanism with 
the pin just visible above the detonator. 
The demining group declined to give any details of compensation, which was reported to have 
been "miserly". 
In 2002 the Victim had been employed in the factory of a PPE manufacturer in Zimbabwe. 
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